The tighten couplings of game strategies with adjoint methods for multi-criterion aerodynamic design optimization are addressed. Its numerical implementation is also described in details. In cooperative game, adjoint methods are coupled in parallel to compute Pareto front collaboratively. Conversely in a Nash game, adjoint methods are coupled in each player's decision making to achieve Nash equilibrium competitively. In Stackelberg game, adjoint methods used by players are nested hierarchically through incomplete and complete decisions of the leader and followers respectively. Several design examples illustrate the efficiency of the coupling algorithms for multi-criterion aerodynamic design optimization problems.
Introduction

1
There are three different game strategies [1] [2] [3] [4] currently used in economics: cooperative games (Pareto) [5] [6] , competitive games (Nash) [7] , and hierarchical games (Stackelberg) [2] [3] . Each game provides different solution with different performance with economical scenarios. Here, in the context of aerospace engineering, we introduce the concept of game in aerodynamic design, where players are assigned the management of criteria and disciplines, and couple it with adjoint methods [8] [9] to solve multi-criterion aerodynamic optimization problems. The adjoint methodology is used as a deterministic optimizer. Furthermore, the above optimizer operates with the ingredients derived from game theory to treat multi-point airfoil optimization.
This article describes the coupled implementation of adjoint methods within different game strategies with the physics modeled by Euler flow analyzers. In a Pareto game, players take collaborative decisions with their global resources through only one parameterized objective function associated to the game, such those *Corresponding author. Tel.: +86-25-84895805.
E-mail address: tangzhili@nuaa.edu.cn Foundation item: National Natural Science Foundation of China (10872093) doi: 10.1016/S1000-9361(08)60062-X adjoint methods can be implemented in parallel for different values of weight aggregated criteria. Conversely, in a Nash game, each player with his own optimizer attempts to reach his own target via a symmetric exchange of information with others and numerically, the initial parameters of the two adjoint methods running in parallel are coupled at the end of each iteration by an exchange of each player's design variable. Finally, in a Stackelberg game, a hierarchy between players is introduced as follows: one player acts as a "leader" (with some strategy terminology), receiving complete information from other players named "followers"; in this situation, adjoint methods used by players are nested hierarchically through incomplete and complete decisions of the leader and followers, respectively. The equilibrium point performances of three game strategies were emphasized theoretically in Ref. [10] . This article focused on the tighten couplings and their numerical implementations of game strategies coupled with adjoint methods for multi-criterion aerodynamic design optimization. Several CFD design problems involving objective functions like drag reduction and lift maximization of airfoils operating in transonic and subsonic Euler flows are compared in terms of quality and efficiency with respect to selected games and proposed as efficient decision maker tools to the designer.
Game Strategies for Multi-objective Optimization
Cooperative games:
Pareto optimal front [5] [6] A general multi-objective optimization problem can be stated as follows min (or max) ( ) ( 1, 2, , )
where f i is the cost function, N the number of objectives, and X a vector whose p components are the design or decision variables.
In a minimization problem, a variable x 1 is said to be partially less than another variable x 2 when , i 
Competitive games: Nash game
Nash optima define a noncooperative multiple objective optimization approach, firstly proposed by J.F. Nash [7] . Suppose the minimization problem is [2] [3] Stackelberg strategy can be summarized as: one player acts as a leader, and all the other agents (the followers) react independently and selfishly relative to the leader's strategy. In mathematics, it can be stated as:
Hierarchical games: Stackelberg game
Suppose we have a triple criterion optimization problem as follows 
and ( *, *) y z is the best solution of followers, e.g. Nash equilibrium 
So, there are two iteration strategies to compute Stackelberg equilibrium numerically. One is leader/ followers strategy, and the other is incentive strategy. [8] [9] The basic optimizer in this article is the deterministic optimization method, and the gradient is computed by solving an adjoint equations. The governing equations for inviscid compressible flow are 2D Euler equations. Suppose that it is desired to achieve a specified pressure distribution p d on airfoil surface. Introduce the cost functional
Adjoint Method for Aerodynamic Design
According control theory, the adjoint equations and the gradient computation are as follows
where is the domain of flow field, and B and c are the far field and solid boundaries of the domain, respectively.
Once the parameterization of airfoil is chosen and the gradient is established, we can modify the airfoil in its negative gradient direction.
Couplings Between Adjoint Methods and
Game Strategies in Multi-criterion Aerodynamic Design Optimization [10] [11] In general, a multi-objective optimization problem 
Numerical procedure of Pareto front strategy coupled with adjoint methods
Thus, we have n players, and Player i is responsible for minimization of f i by modifying the global design variables. A numerical procedure of Pareto/adjoint method is described below:
Step 0 (Initialization): input the weighting constant , 1,2, , i i n , then the Pareto strategy is to solve the following problem:
Optimization starts from an initial guess
i n x x x , then Do loop for Pareto strategy cycles Do loop for adjoint based design methods (for each objective f i , the following steps are run simultaneously on different processor)
Step 1: run the CFD solver, outputs being C l , C d and the flow field variables.
Step 2: run the adjoint solver.
Step 3: compute the global gradient of cost function f i with respect to the global design variables 1 2 ( , , ,
End of adjoint iteration
Step 4: get the total gradient of entire cost function f with respect to global design variables as follows
Step 5: modify the geometry according to the total gradient and obtain new global design variables End of Pareto computation The flow chart of this coupling is shown in Fig.1 . [12] [13] [14] Suppose for the dual criterion optimization problem, where the two cost functions are f 1 and f 2 . Furthermore, let's assume that both are minimization problems. So we have two players, Player 1 is responsible for the minimization of f 1 , and Player 2 is responsible for the minimization of f 2 . A numerical procedure of Nash/ adjoint method is described below:
Numerical procedure of Nash game strategy coupled with adjoint methods
Step 0 (Initialization): specify Nash strategy and split the design variables X in respect to the physics of the optimization problem and the flow field characteristics. For example X = (x 1 , x 2 ), then Nash strategy is 
Do loop for Nash strategy cycles Load each player's optimization task on independent processor simultaneously, and run at each own design point. For Player i, adjust x i to minimize f i , where i = 1,2.
Do loop from k = 1,2,···,K of adjoint based design methods to optimize f i by Player i
Step 3: compute the global gradient of f i with respect to X.
Step 4: project the global gradient into the corresponding subspace, to obtain i i f x . , then, update the whole aerodynamic configuration.
Step 7: identify if Nash equilibrium is reached or not. If yes, we get 1 2 ( *, *) x x and process stops, otherwise old new X X , go to the beginning of Nash strategy.
End of Nash cycles The flow chart of this coupling is shown in Fig.2 . [10] (1) Leader/Follower Stackelberg strategy Suppose for the triple criterion optimization problem, three cost functions are f 1 , f 2 , and f 3 , and they are all minimization problems. So, we have three players, wherein Player 1 is responsible for the minimization of f 1 , Player 2 is responsible for the minimization of f 2 , and Player 3 is responsible for the minimization of f 3 . We further assume that f 1 is leader, and f 2 and f 3 are followers. A numerical procedure of leader/followers Stackelberg/adjoint method is described below:
Step 0 (Initialization): specify Stackelberg strategy and split the design variables X with the physics of the optimization problem and the flow field characteristics. For example 1 2 3 ( , , ) x x x X , then Stackelberg strategy is as follows Do loop from k = 1,2,···,K of adjoint based design methods to optimize f 1 by leader
Step 3: compute the global gradient.
Step 4: project the global gradient into the correspond-ing subspace.
Step 5: modify the partial design variables to get a tentative partially updated aerodynamic shape.
End of adjoint iterations Obtain new partial design variables new 1
x . Then, load the followers' Nash optimization task, and specify the optimization task of each player of followers on the independent processor to make decision simultaneously based on the basis of decision of leader, i.e. Step 6: run the CFD solver, outputs being C l , C d and the flow field variables.
Step 7: run the adjoint solver.
Step 8: compute the global gradient of f i with respect to X.
Step 9: project the global gradient into the corresponding subspace to obtain i i f x .
Step 10: modify the partial design variables to get a tentative partially updated aerodynamic configuration.
End , * ,a n d * x x x x x x go to the beginning of Stackelberg strategy cycles.
End of Stackelberg cycles The flow chart of this coupling is shown in Fig.3 .
(2) Incentive Stackelberg strategy For the Stackelberg game strategy defined in Eq. (15) , numerical implementation of incentive strategy is as inverse as the above. [10] [11] [15] [16] [17] The following numerical results show the coupling effect in three game strategies for solving the two-objective inverse design problem in aerodynamics defined below: (front) (see Fig.4 ) to reconstruct the subsonic performance, and Player 2 designs the remaining portion of airfoil (rear) to reconstruct the transonic performance. The mathematical description of the multi-criteria optimization problem is as follows:
Optimization Examples and Results
Two-objective inverse aerodynamic design problem
where f 1 and f 2 are two criteria or cost functions representing the discrete averaged drag and variance of the drag, respectively. In this section, numerical experiments are performed on a personal computer to illustrate the robust design methodology on shape optimization by using game strategy coupled with the adjoint methods. The uncertainty range of the Mach number is given within the following interval [0.75 -0.1, 0.75 + 0.1]. At first, we discrete this interval into five design points [0.74, 0.745, 0.75, 0.755, 0.76]. The initial shape guess is the NACA 2412 airfoil and the two considered criteria are the mean value (performances) of drag and its variance (stability); finally, inviscid flow analyzers are modeled by the Euler equations. Fig.6 shows the computed Pareto set of nondominated solutions obtained by a multi-objective determi-nistic optimizer minimizing simultaneously the mean value and the variance of the drag of an airfoil. Fig.7 shows the drag performances of optimized airfoils located on the Pareto front with robust design. All these results have been obtained with the Euler mathematical model used for the inviscid compressible flow analyzer. The Nash solution has also been computed as a conflicting game between Player 1 in charge of minimizing the mean value and Player 2 in charge of minimizing the variance of the drag. The corresponding Nash equilibrium is shown on the same figure and compared to the Pareto solutions. 
Conclusions
Adjoint method is coupled with Pareto, Nash and Stackelberg strategies to solve multi-objective aerodynamic design problems successfully.
In Pareto front capture, players make decision cooperatively and dependently because of only one decision maker in the game, so, they play the equivalent roles in the game. In Nash game, the players make decisions simultaneously and independently, and no player is informed of the choice of any other player prior to making its own decision. Moreover, each player must be concerned only with its instantaneous payoff and ignore the effects of its current action on the other players' future behavior. So players are competitive and conflict. In Stackelberg game, the players are not symmetric to each other. Someone plays a centrally controlled role: in other words, it is a leader, wherein the other players make decision following him, say they are followers. So players are hierarchical and noncooperative.
